# 1AR---UKRR---R7

## Civil Service

### Civil Service---1AR

#### No terminal impact to civil service again.

#### Governance underpins resilience against food crises, pandemics, environmental disaster, and unforseen risks. That’s Shulman.

#### Prefer magnitude: extinction is inevitable with weak societal resilience and opaque risks bypass intervening actors because they’re unpredictable.

#### Turns the DA: [x] is inevitable absent governance, but civil servants solve through [x].

### Solvency---1AR

#### Plan insufficient. Fired already aff uq handler says they come back no other options and they like their jobs.

#### Perception is engrained. External: RIFs can say that funds mean they can lay off workers.

#### No card that shutdowns are coming now means that ARIF is zero and solved by collective bargaining rights.

#### Schedule F is wrong. 2AC perez says the plan bans its application to fed workers.

#### Bureaucracy is not dead, it’s on the brink. The plan solves. Agency restrictions are solved by lobbying and not necessary for the plan.

## Whistleblowers

### Cyberattacks---1AR

#### OBBB is aff uniqueness the plan solves them because it

#### Cyberattacks are existential:

#### [x]. It causes miscalc from poor attribution and fog of war, spiraling into nuclear war. That’s Acton.

#### 1NR only asnwered grid. It’s erong and doesn’t assume corruption.

#### [x]. Grid collapse terminates infrastructure and means we don’t have enough energy to function. That’s Heyes.

## T

### C/I---1AR

#### C/I ‘strengthening; can entail the restoration of

#### collective bargaining rights. It immediately deletes the laundry list of cards they read on the limits DA because it doesn’t permit new expansions AND solves ground since there’s a built in ‘old status quo good da’ proven by the unons pic.

#### That’s key to aff gorund. Other expansions of rights get slaughtered by states, and all relevant literature assumes expansion of rights. There’s no interp of what new rights affs can even probide, which means our card cutting is done by the opener.

#### PTIV is not jurisdiction. It’s a conditional test of the violation. Concede their interpretation for evaluating the 1AC. BUT, if you conclude it’s good, then you should read the plan as meeting the rez regardless of language. Jurisdiction is a bad way to understand T debates because we’ve forwsrded other understandings of the plan as topical, so you have a way out.

### Predictability---1AR

#### Their interp headshots predictability.

#### 1. Plain meaning. Adding soldiers to an army would clearly ‘strengthen’ the forces of it.

#### It’s fundamental to semantic interpretation.

Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner 12. Former Supreme Court justice. American lawyer, lexicographer, and teacher. "Ordinary-Meaning Canon." *Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts*, ch. 6.

Words are to be understood in their ordinary, everyday meanings—unless the context indicates that they bear a technical sense.

“The enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said.”

Chief Justice John Marshall,

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 71 (1824).

The ordinary-meaning rule is the most fundamental semantic rule of interpretation.1 It governs constitutions, statutes, rules, and private instruments. Interpreters should not be required to divine arcane nuances or to discover hidden meanings. Justice Joseph Story’s words are as true today as they were when written in the middle of the 19th century, and they are true not just of constitutions but of all other legal instruments:

[E]very word employed in the constitution is to be expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense, unless the context furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it. Constitutions are not designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties, for niceties of expression, for critical propriety, for elaborate shades of meaning, or for the exercise of philosophical acuteness or judicial research. They are instruments of a practical nature, founded on the common business of human life, adapted to common wants, designed for common use, and fitted for common understandings.2

#### 2. Google test. Type ‘collective bargaining rights’ in quotes and 60% of the articles are about fed workers.

#### 3.

#### Predictability. ‘Strengthen collective bargaining’ can mean to create.

Kota Kitagawa & Arata Uemura 13. M.A. Candidate at Kyoto University. J.D. Candidate at Kyoto University. “General statutory minimum wage debate in Germany: Degrees of political intervention in collective bargaining autonomy.” *The Kyoto Economic Review*, Vol. 82, No. 1/2, pp. 59-91. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24898512

Moreover, outside the focus of this article—namely, the process of con flict and compromise, until the 2013 coalitional agreement—the legislative bill containing general minimum-wage law was considered an act that would "strengthen the collective bargaining autonomy." Concrete definitions of the term "strengthen" mainly connote the creation of a framework of collective bargaining that would set the general minimum wage and abolish the requirement of "50%" of AVE in TVG.15 In this act that would strengthen collective bargaining autonomy, the state should not be seen as a "decision-making entity" that would prejudice autonomy (Yamamoto, 2014, p. 37),36 but rather a "capacitating framework" that would enable employers and employees to revamp a loose-bottomed system of industrial relations. Therefore, we consider the act a revamped legal foundation with respect to autonomy.

#### Precision doesn’t matter. Debate is not law school, and we generally don’t care about court decisions because they oscillate, but plain meaning guides resolutional prep.

#### Schauer is from 1982 and wrong. Other expansions of rights disprove because obfergell ‘strengthened’ marriage rights despite the

### Reasonability---1AR

#### Reasonability is offense:

#### Competing interps creates perverse incentives to limit out every aff, crowding substance. Education outweighs because it’s the only external benefit of debate.

#### Limits is a non-sequitur because the judge’s constitutive burden is to determine if the aff is T, not if there’s an interp that makes it not-T. Err toward inclusion if our interp is workable for a season.

#### Limits doesn’t prove anything because our C/I solves it, but that’s question begging and outside the scope of your jurisdiction.

#### Don’t sum interps because your only job is to determine whether the interp itself is reasonable.

#### No intervention. It’s inevitable and competing interps require judge instruction, which also causes it. Intervention is minimized under reasonability because you can axiomatically reject ‘limits first’.

#### Cult of limits prevents a race to the top: empirics prove: we lost great substantive topics like antitrust to a deluge of arbitrary t debates.

## CP

### Condo---1AR

Condo is bad. They can kick if we read perms or theory which solves arbitrariness.

1. Research. The neg kicks counterplans instead of researching straight turn answers, inflating contrived positions. Education outweighs. It’s the only external benefit of debate.

2. Skew. They fleece coverage, make offense a waste of time, and force unwinnable contradictions with inequality Advantage CPs that force econ links.

Arbitrariness. Is bad rejecting all non rez ruins debate theory debates good.

#### Condo is illogical

#### Flex

Three layers of defense:

1. Pre-condo. Kicking before the round solves best neg strategy through prep.

2. Dispo allows infinite worlds---just defend them. No arbitrary.

3. Other rounds solve through iteratively filtering down to the strongest positions.

#### Functional limits other way around solve neg flex.

#### Research aff impact above.

#### Skew not inev under dispor.

### Flex DA---1AR

#### Inherency args on adv 1 cook the DA. They said that experts are key to solve the impact, but then said there are NO EXPERTS now. That takes out the DA but not the aff because we SOLVE and bring everyone back, so we SOLVE the terminal to the DA. That’s Hsu and Handler.

### Link---1AR

#### They have dropped that there CANNOT be a link. 2AC card says that the CSRA explicitly gives agencies authorization to VOID a CBA and IGNORE unions when there’s a real national security agency.

#### First card in 2NC is a MAGA idiot with incentive to lie. That was cross

### AT: Selfish---1AR

#### Bargaining isn’t disruptive:

#### Unions provide collective identity and orient workers toward public good instead of profit, preventing drawn-out negotiations. That’s Bruno.

#### Public sector workers are altruistic!

Tejvan Pettinger 17. studied PPE at LMH, Oxford University and works as an economics teacher and writer. "How can the government avoid public sector failure?" Economics Help. 2/21/2017. https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/10043/economics/

Some public services are sectors of the economy where the usual profit motivate is not all dominant. For example, most doctors, nurses and healthcare workers choose their profession – not to maximise earnings but to gain satisfaction from serving patients. What healthcare professionals need is not performance related pay, but working conditions conducive to good morale. If staff are overworked or have too much paperwork – this can lead to poor morale. Reducing bureaucracy and creating a well-funded health care system is a powerful way to get the most from government funds. It is a similar situation in education, with many teachers over-worked from filling in forms.

### AT: Speed---1AR

#### Worker backlash turns speed.

Casey Keppler 24. Major in the United States Air Force, L.L.M. from the George Washingtom University Law School, J.D. from the University of Iowa College of Law. "The Propriety of Restraint: Assessing the Viability and Wisdom of Executive and Legislative Branch Action to Eliminate Collective Bargaining Rights in the Department of Defense." *Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal*, 41(297), 49.

Although the elimination of collective bargaining would theoretically result in Department employees dedicating more of their work hours to their assigned job duties, this benefit would be outweighed by the countervailing costs.542 Rescinding rights enjoyed for so long by so many cannot reasonably be expected to go smoothly. The emotional reaction to such a substantial change one implemented without input from those affected would likely permeate workplaces nationwide.543 The resulting downturn in employee morale and, in turn, productivity would negatively impact operations.544 The time saved Department-wide with the elimination of collective bargaining would not offset these negative results.545

### --AT: Sherk---1AR

#### Sherk is a genuinely evil guy.

J. Edward Kellough 25. Professor of public administration and policy at the University of Georgia, Ph.D. from Miami University. "The Fragility of Merit: Erosion of the Foundation of Public Service Under Trump." *Review of Public Personnel Administration*," 45(1), 20.

Today, that agreement is threatened by a politicians and conservative policy and legal scholars dedicated to changes that will overturn core aspects of the merit system. Examples of their views are found in statements and policy papers from the Heritage Foundation (2017; Muhlhausen 2017a, 2017b) and in the writings of analysts such as Philip K. Howard (2017). James Sherk, of the Heritage Foundation and later the America First Policy Institute, is another forceful and articulate spokesperson for these views. Sherk served in the Trump Administration on the White House Domestic Policy Council and advocated in carefully argued essays for reforms to make the dismissal of federal workers easier and for the implementation of Schedule F (see, e.g., a statement on these positions in Sherk, 2021). Sherk was the architect of President Trump’s Executive orders of May 25, 2018, and of the President’s Executive Order establishing Schedule F (Sherk, 2022).

## MQD

### 1AR---Sherm City

#### I have no idea what’s going on, but they dropped an add on. We straight turned the agency independence impact, which means it’s certain extinction. It’s upstream of their solvency stuff on the case because it’s solely about how the plan applies legally not functionally.

#### The courts would not resuscitate nondel, because the plan would RESTORE the MQD. The dropped GIA evidence says that they’d cite it as the justification for doing the plan, and they drobbed shiebler that normal means IS the MQD. They said nondelegation will only kick in in a world where courts think the MQD is bad and cant stop agencies, but the plan restores that. That means there is ZERO need to create a new doctrine.

#### If we are wrong.

#### Turns case presupposes winning that non del is created.

### Terms---1AR

#### Aff turns the terminal. We read an add on about food. Expertise in the government is key to check envirommental stressors on food. NOT slow or just about climate change, says that info is key to irrigation and general knowledge about farming.

#### Conceding no trumpp impact takes out the terminal to alliances since Trump is rational and doesn’t make people scared

### Courts Shield---1AR

#### Courts shield the link:

#### Normal means of the plan is a 5-4 decision with more Democrats voting for the plan than Republicans, meaning the plan wouldn’t be a GOP win. That’s Budow.

#### We get to pick normal means. Anything else gives the neg too much leeway.

#### We said in cx and its first card in 1AC

#### Courts don’t rock the boat.

John Mazzone 18. Professor of law at the University of Illinois College of Law. "Above Politics: Congress and the Supreme Court in 2017." *Chicago-Kent Law Review*, 93(2), 408-409.

Absent, too, in the modern Congress is any real sense that the Supreme Court can be brought to heel: say, by constitutional amendment, by stripping the Court of funding, by hauling in members of the Court to justify their rulings before congressional investigatory committees, by appointing special counsels to review and report back on what the Court does, by impeaching the Justices (or locking them up), or by simply ignoring or defying judicial rulings. Perhaps the Court does not rule in ways that offend enough members of Congress (or their constituents) for them to invest the energy—and political capital—required to generate these sorts of measures. Perhaps, instead, members of Congress do not consider such measures appropriate in our constitutional system. In either case, modesty on the part of Congress is the result, even in an era when a single party controls both the Congress and the White House. The lesson for the Court is that so long as it continues doing—more or less—what is has done in recent years, it has very little to fear from the Congress.

CONCLUSION

After President Trump nominated Neil Gorsuch to fill the vacancy on the Supreme Court left by the death of Justice Scalia, fifteen House Republicans sponsored a Resolution that “the House firmly supports the nomination of Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court” and “the Senate should hold a swift confirmation of this nomination.”229 The proposed resolution died, without further action, in the Committee on the Judiciary. While Gorsuch was, of course, confirmed, the failure of the Republican-controlled House to pass a simple resolution supporting the nomination is telling. After an election season in which the Supreme Court figured very prominently, aside from the Senate’s confirmation of a new Justice, Congress in 2017 accomplished nothing with respect to the Supreme Court. Various bills and resolutions—some sponsored by Republicans, others by Democrats, and some garnering bipartisan support—targeted statutory and constitutional rulings by the Court and sought also to impose new regulations upon the Court’s activities. Even the most modest of these proposals failed to advance through the legislative process and become law. We like to think that the Supreme Court, guided solely by the rule of law, is above politics. The experience of 2017 suggests that the Court may also be above politics in the quite different sense that its rulings and activities are largely immune to political response and redress.

#### They’re politically detached.

Chemerinsky ’17 [Erwin; April 1; Professor of Law at UC-Berkeley, J.D. from Harvard University; William & Mary Law Review, “In Defense of Judicial Supremacy,” vol. 58]

Constitutional interpretation is a process of deciding what values are so fundamental that they should be safeguarded from political majorities.48 It makes little sense to entrust these decisions to those same political majorities. The judiciary’s insulation and commitment to decisions based on the merits make it far better suited for this task.49 Professor Alexander Bickel remarked:

[C]ourts have certain capacities for dealing with matters of principle that legislatures and executives do not possess. Judges have, or should have, the leisure, the training, and the insulation to follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends of government. This is crucial in sorting out the enduring values of a society.50

Constitutional interpretation requires an institution to serve as the nation’s moral conscience—an institution responsible for identifying values so important that they should not be sacrificed and reminding the country when its own most cherished values are being violated. At times, the Supreme Court has functioned in exactly this way: as a moral conscience holding the nation to its highest values.51

We should trust the legislature least when the question is the constitutionality of a statute it has enacted. Allowing the same body to both enact laws and determine their constitutionality is no way to protect constitutional values. Review by another branch of government creates a necessary check on the majority.52 The executive veto provides something of a check, but Congress can override a veto.53 Moreover, the President is electorally accountable, at least in his first term, and may feel the same pressures as Congress.54 The judiciary is most detached from both the enactment of laws and the implementation of policies.

#### The plan is unperceived.

Duncan Hosie 25. Academic fellow at Stanford Law School, J.D. from Yale Law School. "Stealth Reversals: Precedent Evasion in the Roberts Court and Constitutional Reclamation." *U.C. Davis Law Review*, 58.1323, 1326-1327.

In the earliest days of the Roberts Court, the legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin reasoned from the latter account of overturning precedent to describe the Court's emerging jurisprudence. Reviewing the October 2006 term, Professor Dworkin argued that the Court's "right-wing phalanx" had subverted precedent "by stealth" in a "rush of 5-4 decisions."In ideologically split decisions involving contentious issues, stealth reversals let the Court's conservative Justices uproot the law without owning up to their actions, agency, and ambitions. This maneuver gave cover for politically charged decisions that Professor Dworkin argued were of "revolutionary character and poor legal quality."

This Article rekindles academic study of these stealth reversals. In the nearly twenty years since Professor Dworkin discerned the stealth reversal phenomenon, it argues that stealth reversals have become a defining feature of the Roberts Court's constitutional and statutory jurisprudence in ideologically split cases advancing conservative ends, especially those generating public salience and investment. For the Court's conservative Justices, stealth reversals offer a realpolitik tool to manage public perceptions of its jurisprudence and the velocity of judicially imposed change, bolstering a public narrative that they are not adjudicating in a historically unusual or partisan manner. This tactic shields the Roberts Court from popular outcry and backlash, tamping down on oppositional organizing aimed at the Court, its privileged role in constitutional decision-making, and its jurisprudence. It also distorts how the academy understands the Roberts Court's treatment of horizontal stare decisis, narrowing the set of cases viewed as precedent-defying under Justice Barrett's "empirical" framework.